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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
JAMES H. BECKSTROM, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
PAUL WILLIAMS, 
Defendant and Resp,ondent. 
Case No. 
8027 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT AND RES.PONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE CAS.E 
This action was commenced by plaintiff and appel-
lant against defendant and respondent for personal 
injury and property damage as a result of a collision 
between a tractor operated by plaintiff and a Chevrolet 
1% ton truck driven by defendant. The collision occurred 
August 3, 1951, about 4:30 p.m. on Utah Highway 228, 
near Benjamin, Utah. The defendant Williams counter-
claimed against plaintiff for property damage and per-
sonal injury. The jury returned a verdict in favor of 
the defendant, no cause of action, on the complaint, and in 
favor of the plaintiff, no cause on action, on the counter-
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elaim of defendant.· Plaintiff appeals from the jury 
verdict, no cause of action, on the complaint. Plaintiff 
and appellant raises three points on his appeal; one 
point on the failure of the court to instruct the jury on 
the thPory of last clear chance; one point on the failure 
of the eourt to give one of plaintiff's requested instruc-
tions <·orwPrning the duty of an operator of a vehicle 
.-ntPring- a highway from a private driveway; and one 
point on the court's ruling on a question propounded to 
a witnt>:-;s by plaintiff's counsel regarding a statement 
allegedly made after the accident by plaintiff to the 
witness. 
STATEl\fENT OF FACT 
August 3, 1951, plaintiff and appellant was driving 
a John Deere Tractor with a side rake attached from the 
yard of his brother, Arch Beckstrom, and drove from a 
private driveway west of Highway Utah 115, out onto 
the highway and the tractor was struck by a Chevrolet 
1lh ton truck being driven south along the highway by 
the defendant and respondent, Paul Williams. Utah 
Highway 228 runs in a north-south direction and joins 
Utah Highways 115 and 147 near Benjamin, Utah 
County, Utah (R. 119). The driveway from where appel-
lant drove extends from the highway into the yard of 
the Arch Beckstrom home. Utah Highway 228 is a 2-lane 
oiled highway, the traveled portion of the highway being 
20 to 21 feet in width (R. 28-63), and there being 
shoulders 2 to 3 feet wide on each side of the oiled por-
tion of the road. The tractor driven by plaintiff and 
appellant was 11lh feet in length and the side rake, 
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including the tow bar, had a length of 17 feet, 8 inches 
(H. 100). There was no other traffic on the roadway at 
the time of the collision (R. 63). Plaintiff and appellant 
was leaving the yard at the Arch Beckstrom home, and 
was going to turn left to proceed north 'along the high-
way (R. 70). There was no posted speed limit on the 
highway, and Willian1s was traveling south at a speed 
of -!5 to 50 miles per hour (R. 51-52). 
The collision that occurred was in the center of the 
right half of the highway, the lane for southbound traf-
fic (R. 120, 124, 126). 
There was a heavy growth of weeds, trees and 
bushes along the fence line to the west side of the high-
way and on the west shoulder of the road north of the 
Beckstrom driveway (R. 28, 47). 
Plaintiff and appellant drove the tractor with side 
rake behind, from the driveway and as he approached 
the highway, had difficulty in observing the traffic com-
ing froPfl the north and had to lean forward to observe 
for sue:hJraffic (R .. 50). Plaintiff Beckstrom had stopped 
the tractor in the yard before crossing the culvert that 
crossed a ditch west of the highway, but he never again 
stopped the tractor until the tractor was out onto the 
highway (R. 71). As the front wheels of the tractor were 
almost to the west side of the traveled portion of the 
highway, plaintiff by leaning forward, looked to the 
north and saw the truck driven by defendant Williams 
approaching at an estimated speed of 45 to 50 1niles per 
hour, and at an estimated distance of 300 to 325 feet 
north of the tractor. Plaintiff and appellant then endea-
3 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
vored to ~top the tractor by manipulation of the gears 
and foot brake, and was able to stop the tractor when 
tlw front wheels reached a position estirnated as 5 feet 
WP::-;t of tl1<' center of the highway (R. 75, 76). At the 
t iHIP t II(• t rador eame to a stop, the Chevrolet truck of 
d<'l'l•ndant and respondent was estirnated by plaintiff to 
be 125 feet north of the tractor. It took plaintiff several 
sel'ond~ to stop the tractor. After stopping, plaintiff did 
nothing to get out of the way or to leave the tractor (R. 
;>~). Defendant and respondent testified that he first 
saw the tractor as it proceeded east and was 2 or 3 feet 
west of the west edge of the oiled portion of the highway, 
and that he was at that time 65 feet north of the tractor 
(R. 135, 150, 151, 158). Defendant's measurement as to 
the distance was made after the accident, measurement 
made frmn the point of impact to the place where he was 
on the highway when he observed the tractor approach-
ing the highway. Defendant, seeing the tractor come 
from behind the bushes and weeds and approaching the 
highway attempted to apply his brakes, felt them take 
hold, but was unable to avoid a collision with the tractor, 
striking the tractor between the front and rear wheels 
( R. 151, 159). After the impact, the tractor was carried 
south along the highway, the car swerving slightly to the 
west as it came to a stop (R. 152, 131). The impact be-
tween the truck and tractor was in the center of the lane 
of traffic for southbound vehicles (R. 120, 126). It had 
just started to sprinkle slightly when the collision 
occurred and after the collision, it rained hard for about 
a half hour (R. 66, 153, 63). 
4 
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Plaintiff and appellant fell frozn the traetor in the 
collision and was taken to the Payson City Hospital. 
While plaintiff was in the Payson City Hospital, he was 
questioned by the investigating highway patrolman, 
Trooper Owen Beardall of Springville, Utah. Officer 
Beardall questioned plaintiff at the hospital concerning 
the accident. and Beckstrom told the officer that he was 
looking back to see that the hay rake missed the bridge, 
and that he never saw the Williams truck. Beckstrom 
denied at the trial that he told Beardall that he was 
looking back and that he said he never saw the vVilliams 
truck ( R. 122, 123). 
Exhibits A, B & C are pictures of the scene of the 
accident. Exhibit A being a photograph taken from a 
point north of the driveway into the Arch Beckstrom 
yard, showing the trees, weeds and telephone pole along 
the west side of the highway to the north of the Beck-
strom driveway. The driveway from where the tractor 
approached is indicated by the automobile shown in the 
picture, the automobile being upon the culvert, that is, 
west of the highway and over which the hay rake was 
passing at the time of the collision. On Exhibit A, indi-
cated by an X is the point of impact between the truck 
and trackor. Exhibit B is a photograph taken from the 
north side of the driveway, looking north along Highway 
228. Exhibit C is a photograph taken south of the drive-
way, looking north past the driveway along Highway 
228. Exhibit D is a photograph taken from a point of 
the highway where plaintiff claims defendant's truck 
was at the time it was first observed by him; the exhibit 
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also shows a tractor which is claimed to be in the position 
of plaintiff's tractor when plaintiff was first able to see 
defendant's truck. Exhibit D does not represent the 
conditions existing at the time of the accident and does 
not show the obstructions to visibility that existed at 
the time. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT ONE 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN FAILING TO 
SUBMIT THE CASE TO THE JURY UPON THE THEORY 
OF LAST CLEAR CHANCE. 
(A) UNDER THE EVIDENCE THE COURT WAS COR-
RECT IN REFUSING TO SUBMIT THE CASE TO THE JURY 
UPON THE THEORY OF LAST CLEAR CHANCE AS SET 
FORTH IN SECTION 480 OF THE RESTATEMENT OF 
TORTS. 
(B) UNDER THE EVIDENCE OF THE CASE THE 
TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY REFUSED TO SUBMIT THE 
CASE TO THE JURY UPON THE LAST CLEAR CHANCE 
DOCTRINE AS SET FORTH IN SECTION 479 OF THE RE-
STATEMENT OF TORTS. 
POINT TWO 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN FAILING AND 
REFUSING TO GIVE PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED INSTRUC-
TION 11, THE COURT HAVING GIVEN SUBSTANTIALLY 
THE REQUESTED INSTRUCTION IN ITS INSTRUCTIONS 
3, 4 AND 12. 
POINT THREE 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY SUSTAINED DE-
FENDANT'S OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFF'S QUESTION TO 
THE WITNESS TANNER TO STATE WHAT PLAINTIFF 
TOLD TANNER IN THE PAYSON HOSPITAL AS TO HOW 
THE ACCIDENT OCCURRED, SUCH QUESTION CALLING 
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F'uR A SELF SEHVlNU S'l'A'l'BMEN'l' MADE HY PLAIN-
TIFF AND BEING HEARSAY EVIDENCE AS TO THE 
FACTS OF THE OCCURRENCE OF THE ACCIDENT. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN FAILING TO 
SUBMIT THE CASE TO THE JURY UPON THE THEORY 
OF LAST CLEAR CHANCE. 
Respondent recognizes that this court on many 
occasions has recognized the last clear chance doctrine 
as set forth in the Restatement of Torts, Section 479 and 
480. The court has affirmed the doctrine as set forth in 
these sections in the cases of ANDERSON V. BINGHAM 
& GARFIELD RAILWAY CO., Utah 214 P 2d 607, 
CO~IPTO~ V. OGDEN UNION RY. & DEPOT CO., 
Ftah 235 Pac. 2d 515, :MOREY V. ROGERS, Utah 252 
Pac. 2d 231, COX V. THOMPSON, Utah, 254 Pac. 2d 
1047, :MINGUS V. OLSEN, 114 Utah 505, 201 Pac. 2d 
-!95, GRAHA~:f V. JOHNSON, 109 Utah 365, 172 Pac. 
2d 665. 
(A) UNDER THE EVIDENCE THE COURT WAS COR-
RECT IN REFUSING TO SUBMIT THE CASE TO THE JURY 
UPON THE THEORY OF LAST CLEAR CHANGE AS SET 
FORTH IN SECTION 480 OF THE RESTATEMENT OF 
TORTS. 
Section 480 of the Restatement of Torts provides: 
"A plaintiff, who, by the exercise of reason'" 
able vigilance could have observed the danger 
created by the defendant's negligence in time to 
have avoided harm therefrom may if, but only if, 
the defendant 
(a) Knew of the plaintiff's situation, and 
(b) Realized or had reason to realize that 
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the plaintiff was inattentive a·rid, tl1~n~~ 
fore, unlikely to discover his peril in time 
to avoid the harni, and, 
( (') rrhereafter is negligent in failing to uti-
lize with reasonable care and competence 
his then existing ability to avoid harming 
the plaintiff." 
Under the facts of the case now before this· court, 
the defendant did not see tractor of plaintiff until de-
fendant was within 65 feet of the place where the acci-
aerit occurred. At that time, the defendant observed 
p~aintiff's tractor approaching the hard surfacedportion 
of the highway, moving east, and the def~ndant being then 
65 feet north of the tractor, and moving at a speed esti-
mated from 40 to 60 miles per hour, immediately 
attempted to apply brakes, but was unable to stop before 
,the impact. Can it be reasonably said, after observillg 
the tractor but 65 feet in front of him, and at the speed 
at which plaintiff was traveling-40 to 60 miles per hour 
~that defendant was negligent in failing to utilize with 
I'~ason~ble care and comp~te~ce his then existing ability 
to avoid harming plaintiff~ 
Plaintiff was only 65 feet away wh~n d.efend.~D.t 
knew plaintiff intended to cross the highway, that is, that 
plaintiff was approaching the highway, and at a slow 
nl:te of speed, 1 to 1¥2 miles per hour. Can .it be said 
~~~~onably that def~ndant at the time he was this short 
distan~e away when he observed the tractor. moving 
slowly and approaching the highway should have reason-
ably known ·of the plaintiff's situation and realized or 
had reaso·n to realize that plaintiff was· inattentive and, 
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therefore, unlikely to di~wover hi8 peril in time to avoid 
hann f Defendant, traveling along a highway and seeing 
a tractor moving very slowly toward the highway, 1 to 
1'l~ miles per hour, cannot be said to have known of the 
plaintiff's inability to stop the tractor before entering 
the highway, cannot be charged with knowing that plain-
tiff was not going to stop before entering onto the high-
way and with knowing that plaintiff WdS inattentive and 
unlikely to discover his peril, i.e., the approach of a 
rapidly moving autonwbile along the highway. The court 
having instructed the jury that the prima facie speed 
li~it was 60 miles per hour, and there being no clailn that 
this instruction was erroneous, it 1nust be assumed that 
the prilna facie speed limit was 60 1niles per hour. 
In1mediately upon seeing the plaintiff's tractor, 
defendant then attempted to stop by application of 
brakes. It is claimed that, if plaintiff had turned to the 
right, he could have avoided the accident, and that there 
was negligence in attempting to stop rather than turn-
ing to the right to the left side of the. highway. Defend-
ant testified that the tractor was moving toward the east 
half of the highway and in the very short time he had 
to act, he applied brakes. Defendant is not charged with 
negligence in failing to take the better of avenues of 
escape afforded him, he is only charged with taking 
reasonable care some avenue to avoid the harm. 
In the case of FRENCH V. UTAH OIL REFINING 
COMPANY, Utah, 216 Pac. 2d 1002, the court held 
that where the shortness of time afforded defendant 
did not offer him an opportunity to make ari exact esti-
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mate of the proper direction to turn to a void a collision, 
that the last clear chance doctrine was not applicable, 
and further that it was not negligence for the driver of 
the truck to have turned rather than proceed forward. 
MORRJ~ON V. PERRY, 104 Utah 139, 151, 140 Pac. 2d 
772, also held that it was not negligence for a driver to 
take one of two courses when an emergency confronted 
him, even though the cour:-~e taken was wrong, and re-
sulted in an aeeident. At JO miles per hour, defendant was 
traveling at the rate of 58.4 feet per second, and at 4.5 
miles per hour he was traveling 65.7 feet per second,; 
therefore, even at the lower of the speed estimates, 
defendant had less than llh seconds to act to avoid the 
acident. 
Defendant did not know plaintiff would drive across 
the highway or realize that plaintiff was inattentive until 
plaintiff did so. After realizing the situation, defendant 
then did utilize with reasonable care and competence his 
then existing ability to avoid harming the plaintiff. 
The antecedent negligence of defendant, if any, was 
in failing to have observed the tractor operated by plain-
tiff before it reached a point two or three feet from the 
west edge of the highway. He then assumed or had the 
right to assume that plaintiff would stop before crossing 
the hard surfaced portion of the highway. Furtherfore, 
antecedent negligence on part of defendant is not suf-
ficient to charge him with liability under the Section 480 
of Restatement of Torts. In the case of ANDERSON 
V. BINGHAM & GARFIELD RAILWAY CO., Utah, 
214 Pac. 2d 607, this court in stating that antecedent 
10 
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neglig·ence i~ not ~ufficient to make the defendant liable 
to the negligent plaintiff, and in analyzing the Section 
480 of the R.estate1nent, says, in quoting the comment on 
cause (c) found under Sec. -! 79 of the Restatement of 
Torts, as follows: 
"(f) Antecedent Lack of Preparation. 
* * * If the defendant, after discovering plain-
tiff's peril, does all that can reasonably be 
expected of hin1, the fact that his efforts are 
defeated by antecedent lack of preparation or a 
previous course of negligent conduct is not suf-
ficient to 1nake him liable. All that is required of 
him is that he use carefully his then available 
ability. Thus if A, a railway engineer discovers 
a wayfarer helpless on a highway crossing which 
he has entered without taking precautions to see 
whether a train was approaching and A, there-
after does all which is then in his power to stop 
the train before it hits the traveler, the traveler 
may not recover against the railroad although his 
position was seen in ample time to stop the train 
had the brakes not been negligently permitted to 
be in bad condition. So too, if a railroad train is 
exceeding the statutory speed limit in approach-
ing a level crossing, but the engineer does not see 
the plaintiff's helpless peril on the crossing in 
time to stop the train, the fact that the train 
could have stopped in the distance bet\veen the 
two points had it been going at the lawful speed, 
is not enough to Inake the defendant liable to the 
negligent plaintiff." 
In the case of :l\IINGUS V. OLSEN, 114 Utah 505, 
201 Pac. 2d 495, Justice Wolfe in his concurring opinion 
says: 
"Under the above quoted section (480) sub-
11 
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di1:ision (a) the defeudanl nwst kuou· of· thf> 
decedent's situa.tion, it is not enough that he could 
have discovered decedent's situation, had he exer-
r·ised ordinary vigilance. 
"~o un]Pss from the evidence it could be 
r<>asonahl~' found that defendant saw deeedent 
during that time, then under this rule plaintiff's 
cannot l'PC'O\'Pr." (Emphasis added) 
The court in this case having held that where the 
ariver of the automobile failed to see an inattentive 
pedestrian who had walked out into the street in front 
of the automobile, and the driver having failed to see 
the pedestrian until within 10 feet of him, that the driver 
of the automobile did not have a last clear chance to 
avoid the accident. 
Under the evidence of the case, Section 480 of the 
Restatement of Torts was not applicable for the reason 
that defendant did not know of plaintiff's situation until 
it was too late to avoid the collision and defendant, 
immediately upon becoming aware ofthe plaintiff's situ-
ation, utilized with reasonable care his then existing 
a:bility to avoid the collision. There being no claim by 
p~~intiff that he, plaintiff was inattentive, and plaintiff 
in fact claiming that he had discovered his own peril. 
(B) UNDER THE EVIDENCE OF THE CASE THE 
TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY REFUSED TO SUBMIT THE 
CASE TO THE JURY UPON THE LAST CLEAR CHANCE 
DOCTRINE AS SET FORTH IN SECTION 479 OF THE RE-
STATEMENT OF TORTS. 
Section 479 of the Restatement of Torts is as fol-
lows: 
... _ "A plaintiff who has negligently subjected 
12 
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hiuuselt to a ri~k of harm frmn the defendant\; 
~nhsequent negligence may recover for the harm 
caused thereby if, ilnmediately proceeding the 
harm, 
(a) The plaintiff is unable to avoid it by the exer-
ci~e of reasonable vigilance and care and 
(b) The defendant, 
(i) I~now~ of the plaintiff's situation and 
realizes the helpless peril involved therein; or 
(ii) !(now~ of the plaintiff's situation and 
has reason to realize the peril involved there-
In, or 
(iii) \\~ ould have discovered the plaintiff's 
situation and thus had reason to realize the 
plaintiff's helpless peril had he exercised the 
vigilance which it was his duty to the plain-
tiff to exercise, and 
(c) Thereafter is negligent in failing to utilize 
with reasonable care and competence his then 
existing ability to avoid harming the plain-
tiff." 
The court in the case of COMPTON V. OGDEN 
1 TNION RY. & DEPOT CO., Utah, 235 Pac. 2d 515, says: 
"That section deals with situations where the 
plaintiff is unable to avoid the consequences of his 
own negligence or what is often referred to as 
~Inextricable peril' and by reason thereof the 
defendant alone has the last clear chance to avert 
an injury to the plaintiff." 
"Where the plaintiff is thus in a position of 
inextricable peril the defendant is liable either: 
(1) If the defendant knows of the plaintiff's 
13 
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·situation and realizes or has reason to realize 
the helpless peril, or, 
( 2) In the case where a duty exists toward the 
plain tiff if in the exercise of reasonable vigi-: 
lance the defendant should have discovered 
the plaintiff's helpless situation in time to 
avoid the injury. But this is so only if the 
plaintiff's negligence has come to a rest and 
plaintiff is, therefore, unable by the exercise 
of reasonable vigilance and care to avoid th~ 
injury.'' 
In this case the court states that the doctrine of 
''inextricable peril" applies to cases where one has negli-
gently caught his foot in a frog on a switch or some other 
such circumstance. The court also in this case refers to 
the other Utah cases where the doctrine of "inextricable 
peril" has been applied, such being; the case of a man 
helpless on the track under a moving train, TEAKLE 
V. SAN PEDRO RAILWAY CO., 32 Utah 279, 90 Pac. 
402; boy asleep on a railroad track KNUTSON V. ORE-
GON SHORT LINE RAILROAD, 79 Utah 145, 2 Pac. 
2d 102, and PALMER V. OREGON SHORT LINE 
RAILROAD, 34 Utah 466, 98 Pac. 689. S.ee also 
GRAHAM V. JOHNSON, 109 Utah 346, 166 P 2d 330. 
The doctrine of last. clear chance under this section 
does not include cases in which a plaintiff has the physi-
cal and mental ability to avoid the risk up to the mome,nt 
of harm. His continuing negligence continues to insulate 
the defendant's negligence and the ordinary rule of con-
tributory negligence governs . the case. COMPTON V. 
OGDEN UNION RY. & DEPOT CO., supra. 
14 
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Defendant coutends that the plaintiff was not in a 
position of "inextricable peril". Plaintiff testified that 
when he canw to a stop on the highway, he looked north 
and again obseryed plaintiff's truck and at that time the 
truck was 125 feet a-way. Plaintiff testified he rmnained 
on the tractor while watching the truck approaching, but 
still proceeded out onto the highway and did nothing to 
get out of the way. Certainly plaintiff had the physical 
and mental ability to get out of the way to avoid the harm 
to himself. His failing to utilize his physical and mental 
ability to avoid the risk of harm was continuing negli-
gence. 
Under the court's ruling in prior cases it is defend-
ant's contention that plaintiff under any circumstance 
was not in a position of "inextricable peril" as is des-
cribed in the CO:\£PTON V. OGDEN UNION RY. & 
DEPOT CO., case quoted before. 
In any event, to invoke the doctrine of last clear 
chance, the evidence must clearly show that the defend-
ant had a last clear chance to avoid the accident. This 
court held in the case of MOREY V. ROGERS, Utah, 252 
Pac. 2d 231, that one should not be liable for failing to 
avoid the effect of the others negligence in a situation 
whe1e it is speculative as to whether he was afforded a 
clear opportunity to avoid it. The court in that case has 
further held that for the question to be properly sub-
mitted to a jury, the evidence must be such as would 
reasonably support the finding that there was a fair and 
clear opportunity to avoid the injury. The court further 
said: 
15 
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"It would . not Le sufficient that it appear 
from hindsight that by some possible safety mea-
sure, or even by reasonable care the defendant, 
"by the skin of his teeth" could have avoided the 
collision." 
~ehis court further held in the case of SANT V. 
MILLEH, 115 Utah 559, 206 Pacific 2nd 719, that a 
pedestrian who walked across a main highway and 
stopped for 3 to 5 seconds with his back to approaching 
traffic was not in "helpless peril" and his negligence was 
continuing. The court further in this case held that as 
there was no showing that the driver of the car involved 
know or has a reasonable chance to discover appellant':-; 
position of danger in time to avoid running into him; 
that the doctrine of last clear chance did not apply. 
This court has further set forth that in order for 
the doctrine of last clear chance to .apply the defendant 
must have a fair and clear opportunity to avoid injury. 
COX Y. THOMPSON, 254 P 2d, 1047; HICKOCK.~V. 
SKINNER, 113 Utah 1, 190 Pac. 2d 514. In GRAHAM 
Y. JOHNSON, 109 Utah 365, 172 Pac. 2d 665, the court 
says, 
"Her opportunity to avoid the accident muat 
not be a mere possibility, but a clear_ opportunity." 
Whether or· not the facts of the case are such that 
it-comes within the provisions of Section 479 or 480 of 
th~ Restatement of Torts, there must be evidence that 
the- defendant, as stated by the court: 
"is negligent in failing to utilize with reason-
able care and competence his then existing ability 
to avoid harming the plaintiff . 
. \ 
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··'dw Lir~t and only negligence which is the 
basis of recovery under the clear chance doctrine 
is this failure of the defendant to avoid the harm, 
having the knowledge and ability to do so." 
The defendant \Yilliams did not have any knowledge 
of the position of harm of plaintiff Beckstrorn until such 
time as he was but 65 feet away from Beckstrmn, or until 
plaintiff failed or was unable to stop the tractor and at. 
that tirne defendant did not have a clear chance to avoid 
the harn1, and he at that time utilized his then existing 
ability to attempt to avoid the accident by attempting 
to stop. 
There is no showing that plaintiff was ever in help-
less peril, no showing that defendant knew of plaintiff's 
situation in such a time that would afford defendant a 
clear chance to avoid the accident, and, therefore, the 
doccrine should not apply. 
Taking each section of Section 479 of the Restate-
ment of Torts, defendant contends: 
(a) That plaintiff was able to avoid the harm to 
himself by the exercise of reasonable vigi-
lance and care, not being in an 'inextricable 
peril', and having the physical and n1ental 
ability to have removed himself from the path 
of the oncoming truck of defendant. 
(b) The defendant, 
(i) Did not know the plaintiff's situation 
until it was too late to avoid the collision, and 
had not the opportunity to realize the help-
less peril, if any, involved. · 
(ii) Did not know of plaintiff's situation and 
had no reason to realize the peril involved 
therein, or 
17 
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(iii) 'rhe plaintiff wa::~ not in helpless peril. 
Under the provisions of Section 479, the court was 
correct in refusing to submit the case to the jury upon 
the theory of last clear chance as set forth in the section. 
POINT r_rwo 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN FAILING AND 
REFUSING TO GIVE PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED INSTRUC-
TION 11, THE COURT HAVING GIVEN SUBSTANTIALLY 
THE REQUESTED INSTRUCTION IN ITS INSTRUCTIONS 
3, 4 AND 12. 
Plaintiff's requested instruction Nn. 11 was: 
"The duty imposed upon the plaintiff in mov-
ing his tractor out of the yard and driveway and 
onto the highway was to exercise that degree of 
care which an ordinarily prudent person would 
exercise under similar circumstances. If he did 
exercise such care, then there would be no negli-
gence on his part in connection therewith." 
The court gave Instructions No. 3, 4 anti 12, as 
follows: 
INSTRUCTION NO. 3. 
"You are instructed that negligence is the 
failure to use ordinary and reasonable care in the 
management of one's property or person. It is 
the failure to do what an ordinary and reasonable 
person would have done under the circumstances, 
or the doing what such person would not have 
done. The fault may lie in acting or in omitting 
to act." 
INSTRUCTION NO. 4. 
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"Ordinary care is that care which persons of 
ordinary prudence would exercise in the manage-
ment of their own affairs in order to avoid injury 
to themselves or to others." Cot 
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iNS'rRUCTION NO. 12. 
''You are instructed that a driver about to 
enter a highway from a private road or driveway 
:shall yield the right of way to vehicles approach-
ing on said highway, and such driver must use 
reasonable and ordinary care to avoid a collision 
with a vehicle proceeding on said highway." 
Instruction No. 12 is not claimed by plaintiff to be 
erroneous and the instruction, in addition to instructing 
regarding the duty of an operator of vehicle entering a 
highway from a private roadway, instructed that the 
driver was obligated to use reasonable and ordinary care 
to avoid a collision with a vehicle proceeding on a high-
way. In Instruction No. 3, the court instructed the jury 
as to what negligence was and in Instruction No. 4 the 
jury was instructed as to the definition of ordinary care. 
Instructi~ns 3 and 4 substantially incorporate plaintiff's 
Instruc( :>n No. 11 and all the instructions taken together 
fairly iri~tructed the jury with no overburden in favor 
of either plaintiff or defendant. The movement of a 
vehicle from a private road or drive~ay onto a highway 
is a matter which is regulated by statute, 57-7-139, Utah 
Code Annotated, 1943, as amended, the code provision 
applicable at the time of the collision, provided as 
follows: 
"The driver of a vehicle about to enter or 
cross a highway from a private road or driveway 
shall yield the right-of-way to all vehicles 
approaching on said highway." 
The court was obligated and did instruct the jury 
concerning plaintiff's duty in driving onto the highway 
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from a private road o~ driveway, and in the Instruction 
No. 12, which instruction covered the statutory duty, the 
court was careful to instruct that the driver had the 
obligation of taking reasonable and ordinar~ care to 
avoid a collision with a vehicle proceeding along the 
highway. 
There was no error on the part of the court in failing 
to give plaintiff's requested Instruction No. 11, the sub-
stance of the instruction having been given by the court 
in the instructions as a whole. 
POINT THREE 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY SUSTAINED DE-
FENDANT'S OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFF'S QUESTION TO 
THE WITNESS TANNER TO STATE WHAT PLAINTIFF 
TOLD TANNER IN THE PAYSON HOSPITAL AS TO HOW 
THE ACCIDENT OCCURRED, SUCH QUESTION CALLING 
FOR A SELF SERVING STATEMENT MADE BY PLAIN-
TIFF AND BEING HEARSAY EVIDENCE AS TO THE 
FACTS OF THE OCCURRENCE OF THE ACCIDENT. 
Officer Beardall, the investigating highway patrol-
man, in the course of his investigation questioned the 
plaintiff at the Payson Hospital and at the hospital the 
plaintiff told Officer Beardall that he never did see 
plaintiff's truck prior to the collision and was looking 
back to the west at the time of the collision (R. 122, 123). 
This admission, by plaintiff, was part of defendant's case 
in chief, introduced as primary evidence of the facts 
stated to Officer Beardall and as substantive evidence 
in the defendant's case. The admission to Officer 
Beardall was not introduced by defendant to impeach 
plaintiff or to attack his credibility, but rather was part 
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of defendant'~ pri1nary l'videnee of the furt that plain-
tiff Heek~trom never did see the truck of defendant and 
Beek~tron1 "·as looking to the back as he drove the tractor 
out onto the highway. 
rrhe Court correctly sustained the defendant's objec-
tion to the question put to the witness Tanner to state 
what the plaintiff Beckstrom told him at the Payson 
Hospital concerning the manner in which the collision 
occurred. As to what Beckstron1 told Tanner at the hos-
pital was self-serving and if the question as to what was 
said \Yere asked to get out the facts of the accident, 
clearly hearsay (R. 181). 
Plaintiff has cited to the court several Utah cases 
which are contended to be in support of the plaintiff's 
position, the cases, however, are contra to plaintiff's 
position, and as a fact, the holding of such cases is that 
in support of the Court's ruling in sustaining the objec-
tion to the witness Tanner concerning what plaintiff told 
Tanner at the hospital regarding the accident. 
In the case of PETERSON V. RICHARDS, 73 Utah 
59, 272 Pac. 229, the Court discusses the difference in the 
rule as to prior consonant statements as between a 1nere 
witness and a party to the action. The Court in the 
quoted case also discusses the other Utah cases which 
have been quoted by plaintiff in support of his position, 
and which case actually are against the position of plain-
tiff. In the quoted case the Court says: 
" .... all admissions of a litigant as to a 
material fact are adduced and received, for the 
purpose of establishing the truth of the state-
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ments made or the existence of a fact to which 
they relate, and on the theory that what a party, 
as to a matter of fact, has voluntarily admitted to 
be true, may be reasonably be taken as true, 
especially as to matter adverse to him, for pre-
sumptively a party ordinarily does not admit as 
true that which is against him unless it is true. 
And of such probative effect are admissions of 
matters of fact of a party generally regarded 
when adverse or disserving and voluntarily made 
as to make a prima facie case to the extent of the 
subject matter of the admission, and to dispense 
with other proof of the fact so admitted and is 
sufficient to support a finding of fact resting 
along upon such extrajudicial admission of a 
party. 3 Jones, Comms. on Evidence, Par. 1072. 
Thus, evidence of adn1issions of a party adduced 
by his adversary in his case in chief, and as a 
part of it, is received as substantive evidence, as 
primary evidence of the fact admitted, and not 
merely to impeach or discredit the testimony 
denies the admission, such but raises a conflict 
in the evidence as to whether the admission was or 
was not made. But in such case it may not be said 
that the party against whom evidence of his 
admission was received was impeached or dis-
credited because he hy his testimony denied mak-
ing the admission. To say the contrary is to say 
that mere conflicts of evidence or testimony con-
stitute impeachments of the respective witnesses. 
In such respect admissions of a party stand on a 
smnewhat different basis than mere inconsistent 
extrajudicial and prior statements, for admissions 
of a party are received as substantive or primary 
evidence of the fact declared, while inconsistent 
statement are received only as affecting the 
credibility of a witness and the weight of his testi-
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1nony, and not a~ (_'\·ide~l('e of the fact declared by 
the inconsistent state1nent." 
Plaintiff made no offer to prove what was said to 
the witness Tanner and the record is void as to what it 
is clain1ed Tanner would have said; therefore, the ques-
tion as to error in sustaining the objection to the state-
ment and question is moot, there being no way to know 
what Tanner would have said. 
~\fter Officer Beardall testified concerning plain-
tiff's statement to him, plaintiff was again called to the 
stand and was able to testify concerning the conversation 
with Beardall and to deny that he made the statement 
attributed to hi1n by Officer Beardall. 
Respondent submits that the court committed no 
prejudical error in sustaining the objection to the ques-
tion put to the witness Tanner. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent respectfully submits that there was no 
prejudicial error in the trial of the action, that the jury 
verdict was just and fair and should be sustained by 
court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
STEW AR~r, CANNON & HANSON, 
Attorneys for Defendant and 
Respondent. 
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